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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
Disposition of forces 
“Don’t hold your breath,” Putin remarked in answer to a straightforward query 
about possible plans to leave politics.  During his televised “town meeting” on 3 
December, Putin deftly fielded carefully vetted questions from the Russian public, 
addressing economic issues and the measures his government continues to roll 
out in order to ease the social impact of the crisis and of new terrorist attacks, as 
well as the inevitable questions about his political future. (1) 
When asked specifically about another run for the presidency, Putin avoided his 
Valdai reference to sorting out plans with Medvedev and left the decision in his 
own hands: "I will think about it, there is still enough time." (2)  This time, 
Medvedev did not wait for the significance of Putin’s comments to create a sense 
of inevitability in his return. "If Putin doesn't rule out running, neither do I rule 
myself out," Medvedev responded from Rome. (3) 
 
Whatever the contours of the initial decisions made in 2007 and 2008 as “Project 
Succession” developed in the Kremlin, there are suspicions now that Medvedev 
might no longer be so willing to step aside, should Putin decide to reassume the 
presidency. 
 
In retrospect, many of President Medvedev’s actions in 2009 appear to be 
advance work for a project now being titled “Modernization,” but perhaps they 
would be more accurately described as Medvedev’s drive for independence…as 
president.  Despite his apparently constrained ability to act with the full powers of 
the presidency, Medvedev does seem to be signaling a willingness to branch out 
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from the two-headed strategy of Russia’s diarchy to build momentum for a new 
phase of political development.  
 
The onset of economic crisis in the fall of 2008 presented Prime Minister Putin 
with a cascading set of financial issues, each potentially capable of spinning off 
episodes of social unrest.  While serious economic questions (including the 
distribution of Russia’s own “bail-out” funds with its consequent need to assist the 
publicly despised oligarchs), have kept Putin occupied, he cannot be insensitive 
to the scope of changes snowballing out from the Kremlin.  It is clear that should 
Putin decide to reassert himself, as he did only rhetorically with the Valdai Club, 
he could diminish Medvedev’s authority in the Russian state, as easily as he 
might win back the presidency. 
 
Repeatedly this year, analysts have gazed at poll numbers meant to reflect 
genuine levels of support throughout Russia for the prime minister and 
president—both ratings highly positive with only occasional moments of 
slippage—despite the groaning economic slump and the re-emergence of 
terrorism in the northern Caucasus.  A clash between Russia’s two political 
heavy weights, however, might produce unexpected, even uncontrollable, 
events.  Nonetheless, a low-level scuffle for control of key institutions, resources, 
and the authority to act independently is not without its merits and could force 
changes to the system that might benefit either side of the tandem. 
 
President Medvedev chose significant, even Leninist, avenues on which to 
demonstrate his independence.  First, the ideological underpinnings of the Putin 
era were redefined: Igor Yurgens, the Director of Russia's Institute for 
Contemporary Development's Management Board, which boasts President 
Medvedev as Chair of the Board of Directors, gave voice to a Russian social 
contract theory in the time of economic crisis: “The social contract consisted of 
limiting of civil rights in exchange for economic well-being,” … “At the current 
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moment, economic well-being is shrinking. Correspondingly, civil rights should 
expand. It’s just simple logic.” (4) 
 
While the theory had its immediate detractors, Medvedev returned to the subject 
during a wide-ranging interview with Novaya gazeta editor, Dmitri Muratov.   
Novaya gazeta had remained a harsh critic of the Putin regime, unlike many of its 
print and electronic rivals, and its masthead bears the names of its journalists 
who have been killed, most presumably for the reports they wrote or investigated.  
Medvedev’s decision to speak with Muratov sent its own signal – possibly a coy 
wooing of the media, even the critical elements.  When asked by Muratov about 
his thoughts on the social contract, Medvedev suggested a “modernization” of 
the social contract that would allow both freedom and prosperity. (5) 
 
Medvedev also began a project to identify top candidates to enter government 
service – the development of his own cadres, specifically distinct from Putin’s 
civil servants.  The Golden 100 project developed from an ukaz on cadre 
management first promulgated in the summer of 2008, and its intention is to 
reinvigorate state bureaucratic structures by creating a list of "reserves" or 
individuals vetted by a team of advisers to serve in the state apparat.  (6) 
 
Institutionally, the Security Council seemed to gain in prominence this year, as 
the president, prime minister and heads of the power organs met regularly to 
discuss a new security concept, foreign policy initiatives, and incidents of 
domestic terrorism.  As usual, the scope of Security Council authority remains 
shrouded behind one and two line announcements of its activities, while 
occasional leaks confirm that the president and prime minister confer on joint 
policy planning and receive advisory reports at its sessions. 
 
Ironically, it was not security issues but electoral miscues that might have done 
the most damage to harmonious diarchical relations this year.  The fraudulent 
ballot handling involved in the October regional elections and the subsequent 
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walk-out by Duma opposition party members served to embarrass United Russia, 
the party of power, and of Putin.  Worse yet, it demonstrated publicly the tenuous 
failings of Russian democracy in a public humiliation that may yet have 
consequences in future elections. 
 
For United Russia, Medvedev, after some public hemming, eventually provided a 
scolding, in which he strongly suggested that central elites keep an eye on 
“overenthusiastic” supporters in the regions: “This year, together we took 
important decisions designed to modernise our country’s political system.  Now I 
would like to once again thank all members of United Russia who supported my 
proposals. I expect the same support in further work on developing democratic 
institutions at the regional level. … Unfortunately we have to admit openly that 
some regional representatives of both United Russia and other parties are guilty 
of this. They occasionally show signs of a retrograde mentality and reduce 
political activity to intrigue and games. Elections are intended to be an 
expression of the popular will, a contest of ideas and programmes, but as a result 
they sometimes turn into exercises in which democratic procedures are confused 
with administrative ones. We must simply get rid of these people and at the same 
time these bad political habits as well.” (7) 
 
In November, President Medvedev made clear his intentions to “Move Forward” 
with a modernization plan for Russia, as elucidated in his Address to the Federal 
Assembly:  “Instead of an archaic society in which the leaders think and decide 
for everyone we will become a society of clever, free and responsible people. 
Instead of chaotic action dictated by nostalgia and prejudice, we will carry out an 
intelligent domestic and foreign policy based on purely pragmatic aims. Instead 
of the Russia of the past we will build the Russia of the present – a modern and 
forward-looking young nation able to take a worthy place in the global economy.” 
(8) 
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There have been seemingly boundless rumors of apparatchiki struggles this 
year, as the siloviki around Putin have found themselves mired in economic crisis 
management.  Medvedev’s more natural milieu, the St. Petersburg intellectuals—
lawyers and economists—have been immersed in issues of judicial reform and 
rooting out bureaucratic corruption.  At the same time, it appears a new 
battleground is breaking over control of Russia’s police.  The MVD, a power 
organ all but subsumed into the FSB under Putin, appears battered by recent 
and consistent allegations of police corruption and abuse.  According to Viktor 
Ilyukhin, the Deputy Chairman of the Duma Committee for Constitutional 
Legislation, “I’m stone-cold confident that it [recent criticism of the MVD] all 
comes down to Nurgaliyev’s job.  Some faction in the corridors of power is 
resolved to promote its own man there….” (9) 
 
A putative battle between the apparatchik supporters of president and prime 
minister could produce a significant number of victims, and depending on its 
duration, inflict serious damage on Russia’s economic, social and political 
prospects.  According to Andrei Ryabov from the Moscow Carnegie Center, the 
authorities are playing with fire when they involve the security services too deeply 
in political games and end up causing a “gradual delegitimization” of the power 
organs.  “What baffles me is the position of the highest echelons of state power. 
… Either they are 100% sure that everything is under control or they are just too 
stupid – or arrogant for that matter – to consider consequences.  That 
reorganization of security structures, not just the Interior Ministry alone, is long 
over due is clear.  These structures became a colossal repressive machine.  
Time to reinstall their initial function, that of protection of the population rather 
than protection of the state from the people.” (10) 
 
Perhaps 2009 will be seen in retrospect as a sort of staging platform, as ideas for 
reform and renovation of the Russian political system joined with personal and 
bureaucratic ambitions to create a new structure that resolves the tensions of 
tandem authority.  Perhaps. 
 6 
 
Putin’s broadcast performance and his answers to the carefully chosen questions 
on his political future leave many questions unresolved.  For some, it appears as 
another act in a long written drama of Russian politics.  As Kremlin analyst Olga 
Kryshtanovskaya noted, "I think it was decided in 2007, when strategy was being 
planned. … I think it was decided that Putin should not seek a third consecutive 
term, but that after four years he could return to the presidency." (11) Perhaps 
that was the plan, but perhaps the plan has changed.  
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Putin: Will Consider Running For President In 2012,” by The Associated 
Press, 3 Dec 09, 10:03 ET; The NPR Website via 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=121045363. 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4)  "Political Aide Says Kremlin May Need to Ease Control," By Andrew Kramer, 
9 Feb 09, New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/10/business/worldbusiness/10ruble.html via 
The ISCIP Analyst, Vol. XV, No. 8, 18 Feb 09. 
(5) Comment by Dmitri Medvedev in "Declarations of Medvedev, 2009 – 
interview with Novaya gazeta," 13 Apr 09, Novaya gazeta via Johnson's Russia 
List, 2009-#71, 16 Apr 09. 
(6) "A list of the first hundred members of the high-potential managerial pool, 
selected under the auspices of the Russian President, has been announced..," 
17 Feb 09, the Kremlin website, http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/sdocs/news.shtml via 
The ISCIP Analyst, “Crisis management, cadre lists, and the Security Council,” 
by Susan J. Cavan, Vol. XV, No. 8, 19 Feb 09.  
(7) Meetings with Representatives of various Communities, Speech at 11th 
United Russia Party Congress, November 21, 2009 
St Petersburg, President of Russia Official Web Portal via 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2009/11/21/1823_type84779_222938.shtml.  
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(8) Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, by 
President Dmitry Medvedev, 12 Nov 09 on The President of Russia Official Web 
Portal (www.kremlin.ru) via 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/speeches/2009/11/12/1321_type70029type82912_2227
02.shtml. 
(9) “Vibration of Elites,” by Alexandra Samarina, Ivan Rodin and Roza Tsvetkova, 
Nezavisimaya gazeta, No. 255, 27 Nov 09; What the Papers Say (WPS) Press 
Service via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(10) Ibid. 
(11) “Putin: Will Consider Running For President In 2012,” ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Rose Monacelli 
 
Putin’s “missing” tiger hints at real conservation issues in Russia 
Avid outdoorsman and recreational hunter Vladimir Putin made headlines in Fall 
2008 when he “saved” a group of journalists and scientists from an attack by an 
angry Amur tiger. The Prime Minister was visiting Ussuri national park in order to 
observe as researchers from the Russian Academy of Sciences outfitted the tiger 
with equipment to monitor its health and migration routes, when the animal 
slipped free of its restraints. The Prime Minister saw the animal charge the group, 
grabbed a weapon, and shot it with a tranquilizer dart in an act that was widely 
publicized around the country. (1) A month later Putin received a Siberian tiger 
cub for his birthday and kept it in a wicker basket at his Moscow home for 
months, before sending it to a zoo. (2) Putin lent his support to efforts aimed at 
helping raise worldwide awareness of Russia’s dwindling Siberian tiger 
population. 
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Until recently, the campaign had been considered a success. As tiger 
populations continue to fall around the world, the relative stability of the Amur 
tigers, which nearly went extinct during the 1940s after decades of illegal 
poaching and the steady erosion of their natural habitat, had been hailed as an 
example for other countries. In addition to strict anti-poaching laws, the Russian 
government created protected habitats for the tigers in the Amur-Ussuri region of 
Primorsky Krai and Khabarovsk Krai in far eastern Siberia. These habitats span 
more than a million acres in the form of two protected zones and three national 
parks. (3) Last week, however, Putin’s movement to save the Amur tigers 
suffered a setback when the Wildlife Conservation Society, a New York-based 
advocacy group, released a report estimating that the tiger population actually 
has declined by 40 percent since 1997 and that after a year that saw a serious 
decline in population in all five protected zones, only approximately 300 remain in 
the wild. The same report alleged that the tracking collar placed on the tiger Putin 
tranquilized had been silent since mid-September. (4) A spokesman from 
Russia’s World Wildlife Fund (WWF) cautioned against assuming the worst, 
claiming that the silence simply could be due to a missing or broken collar or 
dead batteries, but added that the tiger may have fallen victim to poachers. 
Nevertheless, these reports have left many to conclude that the tigers are no 
safer than they were a decade ago.  
 
Poaching may be the least of Russia’s environmental concerns. A January 1999 
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) predicted that the Russian government 
would be “unable to deal effectively with the formidable environmental challenges 
posed by decades of Soviet and post-Soviet environmental mismanagement and 
recurring economic crises.” The report also noted that water and air pollution, 
along with nuclear and other forms of hazardous waste all would contribute to a 
decline in the overall quality of life and that dangerous levels of toxins could 
potentially reduce the ability of Russia’s workforce to function effectively. (5) 
These predictions may have proven correct. The Dnieper River, which originates 
in Russia and flows through Ukraine to the Black Sea, runs through a heavily 
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polluted Ukraine that remains shrouded in “black and orange exhaust from a 
metallurgical plant” and burning garbage fumes and fields of radioactive waste. 
Tests of one tributary found traces of caesium-137 left over from the 1986 
Chernobyl disaster. By comparison, the Danube River, which was similarly 
polluted in 1989, has since rebounded thanks to a fifteen-year, $3.5 billion 
cleanup effort that included construction of waste treatment plants and wetlands 
restoration. (6) 
 
The story of these two rivers is indicative of a larger pattern of post-Soviet 
environmental restoration by Europe and neglect by Russia and other former 
Soviet states, despite European Union attempts to build on their shared “legacy 
of environmental problems from the past, as well as new pressures as they 
return to economic growth” through the Partnership and Co-operation 
Agreements (PCA) and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument. The PCA expired in 2007 and has yet to be updated or replaced. A 
EU-Russia Environmental Dialogue signed in October 2006 similarly has failed to 
produce tangible results. (7) As the authors of the NIE commented more than a 
decade ago, environmental progress in Russia will depend not on foreign 
pressure, but on the ability of the country’s leaders to make it a priority. (8) With 
the economy and national security continuing to dominate the domestic agenda, 
it is doubtful that this will happen anytime in the near future. 
 
In the meantime, the Kremlin will continue its environmental focus, such as it is, 
on the Siberian tiger. The Prime Minister’s spokesman issued a formal denial 
within hours of the Wildlife Conservation Society’s report. Dmitry Peskov claimed 
that the batteries had run down, but that scientists had replaced the collar a week 
earlier. Peskov further revealed that the tiger had given birth and that the cub 
also had been tagged. Peskov announced that the tracking system would be 
updated in order to enable constant tracking. The Kremlin denied the rest of the 
Wildlife Conservation Society’s claims as well, admitting only that the Amur tiger 
population may have decreased, but not by the reported amount. Vladimir Krever 
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of Russia’s WWF blamed “deep snow in the last two years” for “limit[ing] the 
tigers’ ability to roam, making it harder to count them.” (9) 
 
For all that Putin has done to bring the Siberian tiger back to prominence in 
Russia, including the habitat reforms and less sustentative efforts that include 
designating the animal as the symbol of the 2012 Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) summit in Vladivostok, (10) planning a ‘tiger summit’ in 
September 2010 in order to set an international agenda for raising the number of 
tigers worldwide to 6,500 by 2022, (11) and referring to the Siberian tiger as 
Russia’s calling card, the country’s environmental workers say that there is more 
that must be done to save them. The head of Russia’s WWF called the Wildlife 
Conservation Society’s report “a wake-up call that current conservation efforts 
are not going far enough” and blamed logging and infrastructure development for 
a serious decline in the tigers’ habitat and resources. The most serious threat to 
the tigers, however, is still poaching. In the wake of the financial crisis, the 
federal government reduced the funding for programs dedicated to discouraging 
those who seek to sell tiger meat and bones in Asia and pelts in Russia. There is 
also no substantive penalty for those caught in the act. According to Russia’s 
WWF, poachers are only fined 1,000 rubles (US $35). (12) Putin’s project might 
be a good start, but unless these serious issues are recognized and something 
changes, the Amur tigers may be running out of time. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Putin saves journalists from tigress,” Russia Today, 31 Aug 08 via 
http://rt.com/Art_and_Fun/2008-08-
31/putin_saves_journalists_from_tigress_.html. Last accessed 29 Nov 09. 
(2) “Putin sends Siberian tiger cub to south Russia zoo,” RIA Novosti, 4 Dec 08 
via http://en.rian.ru/russia/20081204/118689940.html. Last accessed 29 Nov 09. 
(3) Michael Schwirtz, “Amur Tigers May Again Be on the Decline in Russia,” The 
New York Times, 23 Nov 09 via 
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http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/24/science/earth/24tiger.html. Last accessed 29 
Nov 09. 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) The National Intelligence Council, “The Environmental Outlook in Russia,” 
National Intelligence Estimate, Jan 99 via 
http://www.dni.gov/nic/special_russianoutlook.html. Last accessed 29 Nov 09.  
(6) Arthur Max, “Europe’s post-Soviet greening – gains and failures,” The 
Associated Press, 29 Nov 09 via 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gqd_9oKvQaAOS7ImbWq
tIkLxMxzAD9C9B5KG3. Last accessed 29 Nov 09. 
(7) “Russia and Eastern Neighbours,” European Union - Environment and 
Enlargement, 15 Jan 09 via 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enlarg/russianis_en.htm. Last accessed 29 Nov 
09. 
(8) “The Environmental Outlook in Russia,” Ibid. 
(9) “Government Says Putin's Tiger Safe,” The Moscow Times, 25 Nov 09 via 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/government-says-putins-tiger-
safe/390329.html. Last accessed 29 Nov 09. 
(10) “Putin sends Siberian tiger cub to south Russia zoo,” Ibid. 
(11) Tony Halpin, “Vladimir Putin's endangered tiger is missing, despite satellite 
collar,” The Times, 26 Nov 09 via 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article6932008.ece. Last 
accessed 29 Nov 09. 
(12) “Amur Tigers May Again Be on the Decline in Russia,” Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Legal Issues 
By Sergei Tokmakov 
 
Judges extend death penalty ban 
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The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation on Thursday extended a 13-
year-old moratorium on capital punishment. In its decision, the Court confirmed 
that Russia’s international treaty obligations are an integral part of domestic law. 
(1) 
 
The moratorium was established de facto on May 16, 1996, when then-President 
Boris Yeltsin issued Decree ? 724 "For gradual reduction of the application of the 
death penalty in conjunction with Russia's entry into the Council of Europe." (2) 
Abolition of the death penalty is one of the absolute requirements for all members 
of the Council of Europe. The Council has demonstrated that it would accept a 
moratorium, at least as a temporary measure preceding abolition. 
 
On April 16, 1997, Russia legally bound itself to abolish the death penalty, when 
it signed (but did not ratify) Protocol ? 6 to the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Today, Russia remains the last one of the 47 members of the Council of 
Europe not to have ratified the Protocol. (3) 
 
According to Article 20 of the Russian Constitution, death sentence cases require 
a jury trial. (4) In February, 1999, the Constitutional Court issued a temporary 
stay on all executions until jury trials had been instituted in all regions of the 
Russian Federation. Jury trials now have been established in all but one of 
Russia’s region. On January 1, 2011, Chechnya will become the final Russian 
region to establish jury trials, potentially causing the moratorium to expire on that 
date. (5) 
 
Despite the moratorium, the current Russian Penal Code warrants the death 
penalty for five crimes: aggravated murder (section 105.2); attempted murder of 
a government or public official (section 277); attempted murder of a person 
carrying out justice or a preliminary investigation (section 295); attempted murder 
of a law enforcement officer (section 317); genocide (section 357). (6) Each of 
the five crimes can be punished by death, life imprisonment or incarceration for a 
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minimum term of eight or twelve (depending on the crime) and a maximum of 
twenty years. The death penalty is carried out by a pistol shot to the back of the 
head. Only males between the ages of 18-65 are eligible. The body cannot be 
released to the family and the place of burial cannot be disclosed. (7) 
 
The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation asked the Constitutional Court to 
clarify the status of the capital punishment issue before the key impediment to its 
reinstatement is removed on January 1, 2011 by the establishment of the jury 
trials in Chechnya. (8) 
 
Various ways of resolving the issue were considered at the plenary hearings that 
started on November 9, 2009. Legally, the Constitutional Court has the power to 
uphold or repeal the death penalty laws, or to extend the moratorium. The death 
penalty laws cannot be upheld if Russia continues to be in the process of 
ratification of Protocol ? 6 because, according to the Russian Constitution, 
international treaty obligations take precedence over domestic laws. During the 
Constitutional Court hearings on the issue, representatives of the Duma, Council 
of Federation, and the Government confirmed that Russia continues to be in the 
ratification process. Therefore, Russia is still legally bound to abstain from 
actions that contradict the Protocol and must (eventually) ratify the Protocol and 
eliminate the death penalty, which requires changing the current law. (9) 
 
The Russian Constitution prescribes several ways of invalidating a federal law. 
Ratification of an international treaty triggers the presumption of invalidity of a 
contradicting domestic law. The legislature also can repeal its own laws. Finally, 
the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation can declare certain provisions 
invalid. The Constitutional Court decision on the issue is final and cannot be 
appealed. (10) 
 
The first hearing, on November 9, lasted several hours, and nobody voiced 
support for reinstating the death penalty. “The death penalty will be phased out in 
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the next few years,” said Duma representative Alexander Kharitonov. 
Nevertheless, Duma speaker Boris Gryzlov indicated that the Duma is not yet 
ready to ratify the Protocol, due to the absence of a public consensus on the 
issue - polls show that most Russians support the death penalty. (11) Given the 
Duma’s lack of commitment to abolishing capital punishment, it is unlikely at this 
stage that its members will amend the criminal laws to exclude the death penalty. 
Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court decided not to repeal the law outright, 
which is traditionally the legislature’s prerogative, and opted to extend the 
moratorium instead. 
 
The Court based its decision on the constitutional provision that the death 
penalty is a “temporary and exceptional” form of punishment. Furthermore, the 
constitutionally-guaranteed right to life (and, therefore, right not to be executed) 
is qualified by the provisions of the international treaties to which Russia has 
assented and which are, therefore, part of its domestic jurisprudence. (12) 
 
The recent ruling explicitly states Russia’s intent to continue recognition of the 
norms of international law and incorporate them into the Russian legal system. 
The Council of Europe has expressed hope that Russia will not reinstate the 
death penalty. (13) The Council’s position on the issue clearly played a major 
role in the Court’s decision. The Court noted in its ruling that abolition of capital 
punishment was one of the material terms and obligations undertaken by Russia 
as a condition of its entry into European Union. Therefore, Russia cannot 
sentence criminals to death or execute such sentences unless the country is 
ready to renounce its support of Protocol ? 6. Since September, 1996, 681 
convicted criminals have not been subject to execution. (14) 
 
Former Constitutional Court Chairman Vladimir Tumanov, stated that abolition of 
the death penalty would be a necessary step if Russia was to evolve in the spirit 
of its Constitution, while reinstating the death penalty could result in Russia’s 
expulsion from the Council of Europe. On numerous occasions the Council of 
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Europe has asked Russian authorities not only to abstain from executing 
criminals, but to repeal the capital punishment laws. (15) The Constitutional 
Court, despite possessing the requisite power, decided to exercise judicial 
restraint and not do the Duma’s job, which shows that European pressure 
currently does not outweigh public opinion. 
 
The most important implication of the Constitutional Court’s decision is that it 
continues to recognize Russia’s international obligations without treading on the 
legislature’s turf. Whether capital punishment is reinstated or not is not very 
material because the death penalty continues to exist de facto in Russia, where 
4630 inmates died in 2008. (16) High rates of ill-treatment, torture, and denial of 
necessary medical treatment are among the customary causes. For example, 
fatal cases of tuberculosis are five times more prevalent within the penitentiaries 
than on the outside. So long as the criminal conviction rate continues to hover 
around 99 percent (17), simply standing trial constitutes a death sentence for 
many inmates. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “On November 19, 2009, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation 
ruled that imposition of death penalty in Russia after January 1, 2010 is 
impossible,” The Constitutional Court website, 19 Nov 09 via 
(http://www.ksrf.ru/News/Pages/ViewItem.aspx?ParamId=734). 
(2) "Russian President’s Decree of 16 May 1996 ? 724 ‘For gradual reduction of 
the application of the death penalty in conjunction with Russia's entry into the 
Council of Europe,’ " The Federal Law Portal, 19 Nov 09 via 
(http://www.law.edu.ru/article/article.asp?articleID=1159994). 
(3) “The Constitutional Court of Russia extended the death penalty moratorium 
until Russia ratifies the repealing protocol,” ITAR-TASS, 19 Nov 09 via 
(http://www.itar-tass.com/level2.html?NewsID=14547235&PageNum=0). 
(4) The Constitution of the Russian Federation, 2001 via 
(http://www.constitution.ru/10003000/10003000-4.htm). 
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(5) “The Constitutional Court of Russia,” ITAR-TASS, Ibid. 
(6) See The Penal Code of the Russian Federation, official text, ConsultantPlus, 
17 Nov 09 via (http://www.consultant.ru/popular/ukrf/). 
(7) See The Criminal Correction Code of the Russian Federation, official text, 
ConsultantPlus, 19 Jul 09 via 
(http://www.consultant.ru/popular/uikrf/12_30.html#p2084). 
(8) “Without the death penalty” Interfax, 19 Nov 09 via 
(http://interfax.ru/society/txt.asp?id=110748). 
(9) “The Constitutional Court did not hasten in resolving the death penalty issue 
in Russia,” RIA Novosti, 9 Nov 09 via 
(http://rian.ru/pravo_issue/20091109/192704511.html). 
(10) “Chapter 7. The Judicial Power.” The Constitution of the Russian Federation, 
2001 via (http://www.constitution.ru/10003000/10003000-9.htm). 
(11) “Officials addressed the Constitutional Court against the death penalty,” 
BBC Russian, 9 Nov 09 via 
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/russia/2009/11/091109_russia_death_penalty_cou
rt.shtml). 
(12) “On November 19, 2009, the Constitutional Court,” The Constitutional Court 
website, Ibid. 
(13) “The Council of Europe hopes that Russia will not cancel the death penalty 
moratorium,” RIA Novosti, 11 Nov 09 via 
(http://www.rian.ru/society/20091111/193092534.html). 
(14) “Officials addressed the Constitutional Court,” BBC Russian, Ibid. 
(15) “There are no grounds for cancelling the death penalty moratorium in RF – 
Tumanov,” RIA Novosti, 30 Oct 09 via 
(http://www.rian.ru/constitutional_court/20091030/191324560.html). 
(16) “Can’t execute – it’s pointless,” Novye Izvestiya, 3 Oct 09 via 
(http://www.newizv.ru/news/2009-11-06/116831/). 
(17) “Judicial Statistics,” Website of the Judicial Department at the Supreme 
Court of the Russian Federation, via 
(http://www.cdep.ru/statistics.asp?search_frm_auto=1&dept_id=8). 
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Russian Federation: Foreign and Security Issues 
By Fabian Adami 
 
START update 
For the last few months, Russian and US officials have been engaged in 
discussions geared towards agreeing on a new strategic arms deal before 
START II expires on December 5. Neither the US nor Russia benefits if the talks 
fail because the treaty’s expiry would leave the world’s two largest nuclear 
arsenals unmonitored.    
 
The administration of President Barack Obama already has made at least one 
significant concession under the rubric of arms control, abandoning the European 
ABM component, which Moscow viewed as a threat to its own deterrent 
capabilities. Although Moscow welcomed this move, reports from talks in 
November between Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and National Security Advisor 
James Jones indicated that serious disagreements remained over linkage 
between offensive and defensive weapons, as well as on the subject of non-
nuclear strategic arms. (1)  
 
In the month that has passed since Jones’ Moscow visit, it has emerged that the 
National Security Advisor tabled a compromise proposal on the question of how 
to categorize strategic weapons that has been accepted in principle by Russian 
negotiators. The United States will define “the majority” of its non-nuclear delivery 
platforms as strategic assets, in return for which the four US missile submarines 
converted from ICBM to cruise missile platforms will not be counted in the 
“strategic category” by Moscow. (2)  
 
The fact that this question has been resolved is a step in the right direction, but 
other disputes (including the offensive-defensive one) remain.  
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Moscow argues that warheads merely dismantled for storage, instead of being 
destroyed, should be counted as “actual” because they can so easily be re-
deployed (3), while the United States is seeking to maintain its verification 
capabilities vis à vis Russia’s mobile ICBMs, particularly the Topol and Topol M.  
According to General Nikolai Makarov, Chief of the General Staff of Russia’s 
Armed Forces, permitting mobile US verification teams to remain in situ would be 
unpalatable because “we have no such missions in the US.” The US mission 
should therefore “be abolished.” (4) An unnamed official close to the talks 
supported Makarov’s view, arguing that inspections of Russia’s mobile ICBM 
force would constitute an unacceptable “unilateral” (5) concession.   
 
Moscow apparently has faith that an agreement can be reached, signed, and 
implemented before December 5, in spite of these issues. (6) This confidence 
likely is due in part to the fact that Russia does not expect any difficulties over the 
question of ratification by the Duma or by the United States Congress. This is 
evidenced by Lavrov’s insistence that both countries would be bound by the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states that signatories must 
“refrain from measures that run counter to the subject and objective of the 
document signed by them” in any transitory period. (7) The Obama 
administration, on the other hand, cannot afford to be so cavalier about the 
ratification process, for which reason Michael McFaul (Presidential advisor for 
Russia and Eurasia) has explained, the White House is focused, in the short term 
at least, on reaching a bridging agreement. (8) Whether this can be achieved in 
the remaining days of the Treaty’s life span (at the time of writing, less than a 
week), remains to be seen.  
 
GRU Chief on Georgia, ABM 
On 13 November, Russia’s military intelligence service (GRU) celebrated its 91st 
anniversary. The agency’s new director, Lieutenant-General Aleksandr 
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Shlyakhturov—who took office in April 2009 (9) – used the occasion to speak out 
about a number of issues, including planned reforms and Georgia.  
 
According to Shlyakhturov, there is imminent danger of a renewed conflict in the 
Caucasus: President Mikhail Saakashvili is unpredictable and may yet “yield to 
the temptation to use force” in an attempt to “return these countries…which have 
become independent” (South Ossetia & Abkhazia) to Tbilisi’s “jurisdiction.”(10) 
Shlyakhturov asserted that Georgia is engaging in an intense military 
modernization and re-armament program with a view to such action, with UAV’s, 
tanks and anti-aircraft assets (such as Patriot and Stinger missiles) arriving from 
Israel, Ukraine and the United States respectively; (11) the Turkish government 
is providing assistance in the creation of new “crack” special-forces units tasked 
specifically with operations in mountainous terrain. (12)  
 
Given the events of August 2008 and the increased anti-Georgian rhetoric 
emanating from Moscow throughout this year, it is hardly surprising that Tbilisi is 
taking what it sees as the necessary steps to defend itself. The question is, are 
Shlyakhturov’s comments designed merely as a shot across Saakashvili’s bow, 
or are they part of a gradual ratcheting up process, designed to provide Moscow 
with a “legitimate” Casus Belli in the very near future? 
 
The second subject addressed (albeit more briefly) by the GRU chief concerned 
the recent changes in the US’s National Missile Defense stance. Shlyakhturov 
affirmed the Russian view that any defense system “introduces a certain 
destabilization” in the strategic arena, (13) but acknowledged that Moscow had to 
accept the US desire for some form of defense.  Russia apparently can live with 
the “lesser of the two evils” in the form of a NATO “theater” defense system. (14)  
 
Shlyakhturov’s remarks contained no mention of the reforms that have been 
mooted for GRU for some time, leaving defense pundits to hypothesize on 
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whether the planned reductions and restructuring of the agency’s personnel 
(specifically of its elite units) has begun, or whether they will occur at all.  
 
Source Notes:  
(1) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XVI Number 5, Part 1 (12 Nov 09)  
(2) Russian Officials, Experts Upbeat On New Offensive Arms Treaty – Paper,” 
Vremya novostey, 14 Nov 09; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(3) “Tighter Arms Control Before January?” 11 Nov 09 via 
www.english.ruvr.ru/2009/11/11/2219819.html. 
(4) “RF, US Have Disagreements On START Talks-Gen Staff Chief,” ITAR-
TASS, 12 Nov 09; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(5) “Disputes Hinder Start Talks, Reports Say,” 12 Nov 09, Global Security 
Newswire via www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20091112_2299.php. 
(6) “RF, US Do Best To Prepare New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (Adds),” 
ITAR-TASS, 12 Nov 09; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(7) “Russia, US Will Follow New Arms Treaty Before It Is Ratified,” Interfax –AVN 
Online, 17 Nov 09; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(8) “Russia: Sides Working on ‘Bridging Agreement’ As START Deadline Nears. 
Unattributed Report; ‘Russia and United States Do Not Have Time To Come To 
Agreement on START: Diplomats Preparing Bridging Agreement,’” Inline.ru, 19 
Nov 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection. 
(9) “Russia’s Medvedev Sacks Military Spy Chief,” Reuters, 24 Apr 09 via 
www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE53N21920090424. 
(10) “Russian Intelligence Chief Says Georgia ‘Capable of New Armed 
Aggression,’ Report by Viktor Baranets: "GRU Warns: Saakashvili Is Preparing 
New War,” Komsomolskaya pravda, 14 Nov 09; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(11) Ibid.  
(12) “Georgia Asks Turkey For Help To Create Special Operations Force,” ITAR-
TASS, 13 Nov 09; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(13) “New US ABM Plans For Europe ‘Lesser Evil’—Russian Military Intelligence 
Chief,” ITAR-TASS, 5 Nov 09; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
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Russian Federation: Energy Politics 
By Creelea Henderson 
 
Hiccup: Bushehr startup stalls as Moscow joins IAEA censure 
On November 16, Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko announced that 
Iran’s first nuclear power station, a Russian-built facility at Bushehr, would not 
launch by the end of the year, as previously scheduled. Construction of the 
nuclear power plant was officially completed last March, and Russian and Iranian 
engineers conducted a pre-commissioning test run of its equipment in October. 
But, in spite of the advanced stage of operations, Shmatko said that start up at 
Bushehr would be pushed back until the engineers had issued their findings, and 
stressed that the delay “is defined absolutely 100% by technological conditions.” 
(1) In Tehran, lawmakers were quick to perceive political motives behind 
Moscow’s “technical reasons.” The Iranian Chairman of the Parliamentary 
Committee on Energy, Hamidreza Katouzian, warned that “the Russians should 
know if they politicize the completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant project, 
then ... ties between Iran and Russia would face many changes.” (2) 
 
Tehran’s protests arose days after a meeting took place between Russian 
President Dmitry Medvedev and US President Barack Obama on the sidelines of 
an Asia-Pacific summit in Singapore, and ahead of the November 27 vote by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to censure Iran for failing to disclose 
a secret nuclear enrichment site. (3) In a rare signal of cooperation, Russia 
joined with 24 other nations on that occasion to approve a resolution calling on 
Iran to clarify the purpose of the Fordow plant found buried in a mountainside, 
halt construction of the facility, and allow IAEA inspectors to confirm that there 
are no more such hidden sites. (4) The Russian Foreign Ministry urged Iran to 
“react with full seriousness to the signal contained in the resolution ... and to 
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ensure full cooperation with the agency.” (5) The broad international show of 
support for a tough stance against Iran over its nuclear program has raised 
expectations that the UN soon will approve stringent new sanctions, including 
measures that would block foreign investment in Iran’s oil and gas industries. (6) 
 
Russian participation in the IAEA resolution may signal Moscow’s displeasure at 
Tehran’s decision to back out of a Russian-brokered deal, which would have 
required Iranian nuclear facilities to send low-enriched uranium to Russia, where 
it would be processed and returned as fuel for Iranian research reactors. (7) It 
also may reflect alarm, after the revelation of Iran’s clandestine enrichment site 
showed Moscow’s repeated claims about the peaceful purpose of Iran’s nuclear 
program to be hollow. Whatever the particular cause of Moscow’s discomfort, 
recent developments point to its growing sense of caution toward Iran, including 
the stalled commission of the Bushehr nuclear power station and an overdue 
shipment of S-300 surface-to-air missiles Russia promised to sell Iran in 2007. 
(8) Tehran has threatened to bring legal action against Russia if its contracts are 
not honored promptly. 
 
This is not the first time that development of the Bushehr facility has stalled. The 
plant was already five years behind schedule, when construction ground to a halt 
in 2007 amid Russian claims that Iran had failed to make payments on time. 
Tehran fiercely denied that allegation, calling the delay a political feint timed to 
coincide with UN sanctions. (9) Moscow’s reputation for withholding energy 
supplies for political purposes blooms perennially. 
 
This time, however, Moscow appears to be hedging. On the same day that 
Russia voted to censure Iran, Shmatko retracted his prior announcement, 
claiming the media had misinterpreted it, and he pledged a timely launch for 
Bushehr. (10) Shmatko spoke of the political and economic significance of the 
project for Moscow, noting that, as the first nuclear power plant in the area, “it will 
give an impetus to nuclear power engineering throughout the Persian Gulf area.” 
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Sounding chastened, he added, “and we realize the responsibility that we bear.” 
(11) Two days later, he paid a state visit to Tehran, where he met the head of 
Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, with whom he toured the 
Bushehr facility, which he called “a symbol of cooperation between Iran and 
Russia and nobody dares to hurt it.” (12) In the course of the visit he also held 
talks with Iranian Oil Minister Masoud Mir-Kazemi about Russian companies’ 
involvement in Iran’s oil, gas, and petrochemicals industries. 
 
With new sanctions pending in the UN, Russia appears to be using its state-to-
state leverage with Tehran to secure lucrative eleventh-hour deals and to further 
its national interests in the nuclear technology market, in Iranian upstream oil and 
gas sectors and in other energy ventures. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Russia delays Iran's Bushehr nuclear power station,” Reuters, 16 Nov 09 via 
(http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE5AF1MF20091116). 
(2) “Lavrov: Bushehr delay not political,” PressTV, 18 Nov 09 via 
(http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=111580&sectionid=351020104). 
(3) “IAEA votes to censure Iran over nuclear cover-up,” Reuters, 27 Nov 09 via 
(http://www.reuters.com/article/GCA-
Iran/idUSTRE5AQ1BZ20091127?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=11621&
sp=true). 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) Ibid. 
(6) “U.S. Is Seeking a Range of Sanctions Against Iran,” The New York Times, 
27 Nov 09 via 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/28/world/middleeast/28iran.html). 
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(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8362023.stm). 
(8) Ibid. 
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